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Introduction
How responsive is work e ort to transitory wage changes? Most estimates of life cycle models of labor supply using individual panel data e.g., MaCurdy 1981 , Browning, Deaton, and Irish 1985 , Altonji 1986 imply that this elasticity i s v ery small. 1 However, these studies relate annual changes in hours worked to annual changes in average hourly earnings, and it seems doubtful that measured annual wage changes are either fully anticipated or purely transitory. As a result, the observed wage change may becorrelated with an unobserved but possibly large change in expected lifetime wealth and therefore the estimate of the intertemporal substitution elasticity as well as other labor supply elasticities of interest is likely to be biased downward. 2 Recently, Camerer, et. al. 1997 analyzed the daily labor supply behavior of New York City taxicab drivers. They argue that this is a promising group to study because the daily demand for taxi services is subject to large but transitory shocks due to weather conditions, conventions, day-of-the-week e ects, etc. As a result, there is exogenous variation in the cab driver wage" across days, but the very temporary nature of these wage changes implies that any wealth e ects should be negligible. In sharp contrast to the prediction from dynamic labor supply models, however, Camerer, et. al. nd signi cantly negative wage elasticities of hours worked; the cab drivers in their samples work fewer hours on high wage days.
Inclusion of individual xed e ects and estimation by instrumental variables methods does not alter this result. Camerer, et. al. explain their ndings by arguing that cab drivers have very short one day horizons and xed daily income targets. They observe more generally, however, that their results raise questions about the empirical relevance of the idea that workers substitute work e ort towards times when the return to work is high.
While the motivation for studying the e ects of daily wage changes on labor supply 1 An exception is Heckman and MaCurdy 1980, 1982 is compelling, the source of the daily variation in cab driver wages is not entirely clear.
Although Camerer, et. al. posit that shifts in demand for taxi services are the driving force, they have no data on obvious demand shifters that allows them to check this assumption.
Likewise, they have no aggregate quantity data, which could shed light on the source of the wage movements across days. But if the observed daily wage uctuations result partly from shifts in the labor supply curves of cab drivers, then the estimated labor supply elasticities reported by Camerer, et. al. are inconsistent. 3 Clearly, i t w ould be desirable to have data on exogenous demand shifters that could be used as instruments for the observed daily wage. 4 The present paper follows in the spirit of Camerer, et. al. 1997 by analyzing the daily labor supply behavior of a di erent group of workers | stadium vendors at major league baseball games. 5 Like those authors, I seek to measure how labor supply responds to day-today v ariation in the wage. To address this question, I obtained complete participation and earnings data for every vendor at every game at a single stadium during the 1996 baseball season. As I show below, the wage varied substantially across games. But, as with cab drivers, this wage variation could result from either demand shifts or supply shifts. Unlike Camerer, et. al., however, I observe the key shifter of demand for vendor services | game attendance | as well as a numberofgoodex ante predictors of attendance. These demand shift variables provide me with goodinstruments for the wage and therefore allow me to obtain credible estimates of the labor supply elasticity. In its focus on a labor market subject to large and observable demand shifts, this paper resembles Carrington's 1996 analysis 3 Camerer, et. al. do have data on weather conditions and the day of the week and time of day when the shift was worked, which allows them to control for some potential supply shifters. But there might exist other important supply shifters that are unmeasured. For example, if many cab drivers hold second jobs in industries where demand is sensitive to the presence of conventions, then the arrival of a convention will shift both the supply and demand curves for taxi services. 4 The instrumental variable estimates reported by Camerer, et. al. use summary statistics of the daily wages of all cab drivers in the sample who work on a given day as instruments for the wage of each individual cab driver. This is a reasonable strategy for eliminating bias resulting from driver-speci c measurement error in reported hours and hence the measured hourly wage but it will not eliminate any bias from the potential endogeneity of the wage via shifts in the cab drivers' labor supply curves. 5 Throughout this paper, the term vendors" refers exclusively to the workers who walk through the stadium seats selling food and beverages out of portable cases. of the Alaskan labor market during the era of construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. Unlike Carrington, though, I have panel data on individuals and therefore I can analyze labor supply behavior both at the individual level and in the aggregate i.e., the labor supply curve facing the rm that employs the vendors.
Brie y summarizing the empirical results, I always nd that the wage elasticity of labor supply participation for stadium vendors is positive and substantial. Typical elasticity estimates are in the 0.55-0.65 range, although the results vary a bit depending on the choice of instruments and on whether the estimation uses individual-level panel data or time series data on aggregate vendor participation and average game earnings. The aggregate analyses additionally reveal that treating the daily wage" as exogenous in the labor supply equation i.e., assuming that demand shifts are the sole source of unexplained game-togame wage variation causes a large downward bias in the estimated labor supply elasticity.
Thus, one must instrument for the vendor wage using observable demand shifters to consistently estimate the vendor labor supply elasticity. This last nding suggests that estimates of labor supply elasticities for speci c labor markets, where unobserved individual labor supply shocks plausibly have an important common component, must be interpreted very cautiously unless demand shifters are used to instrument for the wage.
The remainder of the paper consists of ve parts. The next section describes the relevant features of the vendor labor market. Section 3 develops a theoretical model of vendor labor supply behavior. Section 4 outlines the econometric model and the estimation strategy.
Section 5 presents the empirical analysis. Finally, section 6 puts the results in perspective and o ers some concluding observations.
Background Information on the Vendor Labor Market
This paper analyzes the labor supply of stadium vendors using the complete set of participation and earnings histories of all of the vendors who worked at any of the games played at a single stadium during the 1996 major league baseball season. In this section, I brie y describe those aspects of the vendor labor market that are relevant either for modelling vendor behavior or for analyzing data on vendor earnings and labor supply.
During the 1996 season, the foodandbeverage vending business i.e., the sale of food and beverage products by mobile vendors circulating through the stadium was operated by a rm that I hereafter refer to as the vending subcontractor". The vending subcontractor, which t o o k o ver the vending business at the stadium in 1995, paid the primary concessions contractor a share of the vendors' sales revenue in return for the exclusive right to the operate the vending business. 6 The vending subcontractor in turn hired vendors to walk through the stands and sell food and beverage products at the games. The stadium vendors sold six di erent products: beer, cotton candy, lemon ice, peanuts, popcorn, and soda. The selection of products sold by the vendors and their prices which include sales tax were decided by the primary concessions contractor prior to the season and did not change during the season.
The vending subcontractor paid its vendors a straight commission on their dollar sales net of sales tax at each game during the 1996 season. Both the decision to adopt a pure piece rate compensation scheme and the choice of commission rate levels were made solely by the vending subcontractor. At the request of the vending subcontractor, I do not disclose either the vendor commission rate levels or the share of vendor sales revenues that the subcontractor paid to the primary concessions contractor. However, I can describe the basic commission rate structure. In brief, commission rates varied with the vendor's seniority a t the start of the 1996 season and with the product sold. Holding product constant, vendors with greater seniority received higher commission rates, with a spread of .02 between the most and least senior vendors. Holding date of hire constant, the commission rate for beer sales was .05 lower than the commission rate for sales of other products. This pattern of commission rates prevailed throughout the 1996 season. Thus, vendor commission rates 6 The primary concessions contractor continued to operate the xed concessions stands located in the stadium.
were not adjusted in response to vendor sales performance during the 1996 season.
By the start of the 1996 baseball season, the vending subcontractor had recruited an extensive poolof vendors. The vendors are independent contractors, not employees, and therefore are not covered by minimum wage legislation and are not subject to employee payroll taxes. More important for present purposes, each v endor also decides freely whether or not to work at any given game. To help ensure that enough" vendors show up at each game, the vending subcontractor asks vendors to sign up in advance for the games they intend to work on a publicly posted work schedule. If the schedule suggests that vendor turnout for a particular game will be low", given anticipated attendance, the vending subcontractor will often contact prospective vendors who have not signed up and try to enlist their services. The important point, however, is that the schedule is not binding in any way; unscheduled vendors who show up to work a game are never turned away and scheduled vendors who miss a game are never disciplined. Moreover, vendors who the subcontractor tries to enlist on short notice are under no obligation to work and they receive no extra compensation if they choose to work. 7 At the stadium, a vendor's work routine is straightforward. Vendors arrive about one hour before the game begins. After arrival, the subcontractor assigns each v endor a product or products to sell at that game. To the extent possible, the subcontractor accommodates 7 One might w onder why the vending subcontractor does not choose to control vendor turnout more precisely by imposing a stricter work schedule. The apparent answer is that this would jeopardize the vendors' independent contractor status, thereby threatening the subcontractor with higher labor costs through both partial incidence of employee payroll taxes and the xed expense of payroll tax compliance. Under the common law, a worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee only if the right to direct and control" the work process lies primarily with the worker. The key factor in deciding who retains primary control rights is the worker's degree of autonomy on the job. For more details, see U.S. Department of Treasury 1996. Imposing a stricter work schedule and punishing absenteeism would clearly restrict a vendor's right to direct and control", possibly calling independent contractor status into question.
Preserving vendors' independent contractor status also might explain why vendors were paid a pure commission, even though optimal linear piece rate contracts generally include both a possibly negative xed wage component and a piece rate Lazear 1986. The common law generally views payment o f a positive xed wage, even in combination with a piece rate, as evidence of an employee relationship. At the same time, if a negative xed wage component w ere optimal but if requiring vendors to pay a xed fee were infeasible, then the subcontractor could reproduce this compensation scheme by combining a piece rate with a minimum sales standard. However, dismissing low-performing vendors would again limit the vendor's right to direct and control". Given these constraints, it might be optimal for the subcontractor to pay v endors a straight commission. the preferences of individual vendors when making product assignments. 8 The subcontractor also assigns each v endor to work at either the eld level or the mezzanine level. Vendors assigned to the eld level are not supposed to sell on the mezzanine level, and vice versa, but there is a third main seating area in the stadium, the upper level, where all vendors are allowed to sell. 9 Around game time, vendors begin walking through the stands and selling their products. Vendors are only allowed to sell in the seats"; selling along the stadium concourses and, in particular, in front of the concession stands is prohibited. When a vendor has sold out of his product, he returns to the supply room on his assigned level and buys" a new batch of the product with the proceeds from the previous load. Vendors continue selling until the end of the seventh inning, when they return to their assigned supply rooms and settle their daily sales accounts.
A Model of Vendor Labor Supply
The quantity of labor supplied by each v endor on each game date depends on both a participation decision and a choice of e ort e.g., how fast to circulate through the stands, how loud and frequently to yell. Unlike the standard model of labor supply, h o wever, the vendors who I study make no hours decision given participation; instead, each participating vendor works from the start of the game through the seventh inning. 10 In addition, because e ort choices are unobservable, I focus exclusively on participation decisions in the present paper. 11 The absence of an hours margin and my focus on the participation decision has 8 Presumably, vendors di er in their product preferences both because products di er in their e ort requirements e.g., a case of beer is much heavier than a rack of cotton candy and vendors di er in their disutility of e ort. 9 An arbitrage argument suggests that the assigned work location should have no impact on sales if, as is true in practice, both eld level vendors and mezzanine level vendors visit the upper level.
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In principle, a vendor could quit selling early, but the subcontractor reports that this does not occur. The apparent reason is that the cashiers who settle the vendors' daily sales accounts are not available for this task until after the seventh inning, so a vendor who quits selling early would still have t o w ait until the end of the seventh inning before collecting his daily pay. This behavior, if it occurs, can be thought o f a s a reduction in e ort.
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In an earlier version of this paper Oettinger 1997, I specify a model of e ort choice and perform some additional empirical analyses which suggest that e ort elasticities with respect to both game attendance and the commission rate are positive and substantial. However, these conclusions rely on an untestable two implications that the reader should keep in mind when perusing the empirical results.
First, unlike most papers on labor supply that estimate the elasticity of hours worked with respect to the wage in some broadly de ned labor market, I estimate the elasticity of participation in a very narrowly de ned labor market with respect to the wage in that labor market. And second, to the extent that participating vendors supply more e ort when the return to e ort high, the participation elasticity understates the overall labor supply response to shifts in demand.
I assume that vendor i participates at game t if and only if his expected earnings equal or exceed his opportunity cost. Let C it denote the opportunity cost for vendor i at game t and let G j Z it be the distribution from which C it is drawn. Z it is a vector of opportunity cost shifters that might v ary across both individuals and dates, so there is no presumption that all vendors draw from the same opportunity cost distribution. Conditional on the set of realized opportunity costs, aggregate vendor participation at game t as a function of per vendor expected earnings, y, is N t y = P N p t i=1 1 C it y , where N p t denotes the numberof potential vendors on date t and 1 is an indicator function for the condition inside the brackets. N t y is a positive step function in y and therefore the aggregate labor supply participation curve is upward-sloping. Taking the expectation of N t y over the random opportunity cost realizations yields the expected or average aggregate participation curve, EN t y = P N p t i=1 Gy j Z it : If opportunity costs are continuous random variables, EN t y is a smooth upward-sloping labor supply curve, and changes in components of Z it that are common to all vendors will cause systematic shifts in the aggregate labor supply curve. 12 I assume that vendor i's latent earnings at game t are Y it = F N t ; X t + e it , where functional form assumption on the production function that maps unobserved e ort into observed earnings.
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If vendor i observes his own opportunity cost realization, but not the opportunity cost realizations of the other potential vendors, before deciding whether to participate at game t, then the expected aggregate labor supply curve from vendor i's perspective i s EiNty = 1 Cit y + P j6 =i Gy j Zjt. Clearly, EiNty need not equal EjNty for i 6 = j, and therefore expected earnings at game t could di er for identical vendors. However, as long as the opportunity cost distributions are common knowledge, the di erence between EiNty and EjNty for i 6 = j will become trivial as N p t becomes large.
N t denotes the total number of vendors working at game t, X t is a vector of product demand shifters at game t, and e it captures random determinants of earnings. Allowing for a vendor-speci c earnings component is straightforward and I include vendor xed e ects in the individual-level empirical analysis. This extension does not alter any of the model's predictions, however, and therefore I present the case where vendors are identical to simplify the exposition. With identical vendors, each anticipates the same earnings conditional on product demand conditions and aggregate vendor participation, namely y EY it j N t ; X t = F N t ; X t . Holding X t xed, the function F N t ; X t can be viewed as an expected average product of labor curve. If some of the marginal vendor's sales come from customers who are diverted from the inframarginal vendors, then vendors compete for sales and the average product of labor curve slopes downward. 13 Changes in product demand conditions alter average vendor productivity for any given level of aggregate vendor participation and therefore shift the average product curve.
Each potential vendor participates at game t so long as expected earnings at least cover the opportunity cost of participation. Thus, the equilibrium numberofparticipating vendors and the equilibrium level of earnings per vendor at game t are determined by the requirement that the marginal vendor's opportunity cost of participation equals expected vendor earnings. This condition holds where the aggregate labor supply and average product of labor curves cross. Clearly, positive product demand shocks raise the probability o f participation, aggregate participation, and per vendor earnings in equilibrium, all else equal.
Positive opportunity cost shocks also raise equilibrium per vendor earnings but reduce the probability of participation and aggregate participation, other things equal. Of course, since both curves can shift from game to game, simple regressions of participation measures on vendor earnings measures will not yield a consistent estimate of the labor supply participation elasticity in general. Instead, obtaining consistent estimates requires instrumental 13 In practice, for a given state of product demand, FN is probably close to zero for Nt near zero and becomes more negative a s Nt becomes larger. In a model where vendors choose e ort, an additional reason for FN 0 is that for plausible functional forms an increase in the numberofvendors reduces the optimal e ort level.
variable-type estimation. The next section describes two approaches, one using individual panel data and the other using the time series data on aggregate participation and average vendor earnings, for consistently estimating the elasticity o f v endor labor supply.
Econometric Methodology

Individual-Level Labor Supply
The theory developed above assumes that each potential vendor compares opportunity costs and expected earnings when making the participation decision. Consistent with this decision process, I specify equations for, respectively, the log of the opportunity cost of participation and the log of earnings from vending for potential vendor i on date t:
Of course, the econometrician does not observe ln C it and only observes ln Y it for participating vendors.
Equation 1 speci es opportunity costs for vendor i on date t as a function of observable cost shifters Z it , a vendor-speci c xed e ect i , and an independent random shock u it .
The idiosyncratic disturbance, u it , although unobserved by the econometrician, is assumed to be known to the potential vendor prior to the participation decision. The vendor xed e ect captures any xed over the season di erences across vendors in their non-vending opportunities. Finally, the vector Z it always includes indicators for the day, time, and season of game t and interactions of these variables with some basic vendor demographic characteristics dummies for age category, race, and sex. 14 The game time indicators capture any common systematic variation in opportunity costs across times of the day,
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The time-invariant v endor demographic characteristics cannot be included in Zit because of the presence of the vendor xed e ects in 1. days of the week, and seasons of the year while the interactions capture any systematic di erences across demographic categories in the temporal pattern of opportunity costs. 15 I also include measures of weather conditions on date t the daytime high temperature and a dummy for rainfall in excess of a quarter inch in Z it . In addition, I sometimes expand Z it to include indicators for the opposing team and measures of the home and visiting teams' current positions in the standings. These speci cations allow for the possibility that vendors are themselves baseball fans whose participation decisions are in uenced by the quality of the opposing team or the game's importance to the pennant race. Equation 2 speci es vendor i's earnings on date t, given participation, as a function of observable predictors of earnings X it , a vendor-speci c xed e ect i , and two unobserved by the econometrician random components it and it . This is a reduced form earnings equation and therefore X it consists only of variables that vendors observe before making participation decisions. In the empirical analysis, X it always includes measures of when game t is played day of week, time of day, and season, weather conditions on date t, whether game t is a promotional date", the opposing team, the current place in the standings of both the home and visiting teams, and the number of other potential vendors on date t. 16 In addition, in some speci cations I include actual attendance at game t as part of X it . These speci cations assume that vendors have perfect foresight about game attendance, which might not be an unreasonable approximation if vendors have important additional prior information about attendance that I cannot measure. 17 15 Systematic di erences across demographic groups in the temporal pattern of opportunity costs would exist if, for example, the opportunity costs of participation on weekday afternoons relative t o w eekends are higher for teenage vendors, who are likely to be enrolled in school, than for older vendors. 16 The promotional date" dummy identi es games at which the fans in attendance received free souvenirs or other special bene ts e.g., kids allowed to run the bases" on the playing eld after the game. All such dates were scheduled before the season and were well-publicized. The number of other potential vendors on date t might a ect aggregate participation by other vendors, and therefore vendor i's earnings, on date t. I describe how measures of the number of other potential vendors on each date t are constructed in section 5 of the paper.
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A regression of game attendance on all of the ex ante predictors of attendance that I can observe e.g., time of game dummies, opponent dummies, the promotional date dummy, etc. has an R The xed vendor e ect in 2 captures permanent o ver the season earnings di erences among vendors resulting, say, from di erences in vending ability or commission rates. The two transitory unobserved earnings components distinguish conceptually between those components that the vendor observes prior to the participation decision it and those that he does not it . For example, vendor i's energy level on date t would be part of it while vendor i's random sales luck on date t would be part of it . The unforecastable part of product demand conditions also would belong to it . I assume that these random shocks are mutually independent and independent of all of the other variables in the model.
As noted earlier, potential vendor i participates on date t only if expected earnings equal or exceed opportunity costs. Thus, letting it f Z it ; X it ; i ; i ; u it ; it g denote the information set at the time of the participation decision, vendor i participates only if EY it j it C it or, equivalently, i f l n EY it j it ln C it . Taking the expectation of 2 conditional on it gives Eln Y it j it = X it + i + it . However, given the independence assumptions on the error terms, Eln Y it j it and ln EY it j it di er by only a constant, and therefore only the estimated constant term is a ected if one assumes that participation is determined by a comparison of ln C it with Eln Y it j it , instead of ln EY it j it . 18 Thus, I de ne a participation indicator for vendor i on date t, P it , and I assume that P it = 1 if and only if Eln Y it j it ln C it . I estimate the individual-level model of vendor participation in several steps. I rst estimate a reduced form model for participation. I assume that the idiosyncratic error terms are normally distributed and therefore estimate a probit model. The explanatory variables consist of observable opportunity cost shifters Z it , observable predictors of earnings X it , and a complete set of individual vendor dummies. 19 Next, I estimate a selectivity-corrected log earnings equation. The adjustment for selec-
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In general, if ln Y = X + u and Eu j X = 0, then straightforward algebra gives ln EY j X = Eln Y j X + l n Ee u j X. If u and X are independent, then Ee u j X = Ee u , a constant. tion is necessary because earnings are only observed for vendors with Eln Y it j it ln C it and this self-selected participation induces a correlation between the idiosyncratic errors and the explanatory variables in the sample of participating vendors. In particular, expected log earnings conditional on the observables, the vendor xed e ect, and participation are Eln Y it j X it ; Z it ; i ; P it = 1 = X it + i + E it j it + u it Z it , X it + i , i : 3
The conditional expectation on the right-hand side of 3 represents the bias from selfselected participation. However, including an inverse Mills ratio term, derived from the reduced form participation probit estimates, as an additional explanatory variable in 2 corrects for this bias Heckman 1976 . The selection correction term is identi ed if some variables a ect opportunity costs and hence participation but not earnings. I assume that the interactions between vendor i's demographic characteristics and the day, time, and season of game t satisfy this condition. This assumption says that the temporal variation in vendor opportunity costs di ers systematically across demographic categories but that the temporal variation in vendor expected earnings productivity does not. 20 Given the earnings equation estimates, I construct predicted log earnings using 3. This gives me an uncensored sample of wage" observations for all of the potential vendors on every game date, regardless of actual participation decisions. Using this variable, I estimate a structural probit model of participation. This last model explains participation decisions as a function of opportunity cost shifters Z it , predicted log earnings d ln Y it , and vendor xed e ects. The model is identi ed as long as some of the predictors of vendor i's earnings at game t do not also directly in uence vendor i's opportunity cost of participation. Many of the product demand shifters | for example, attendance at game t, whether game t is a 20 To take a concrete example, I am assuming that the relative opportunity costs of participating on a weekday afternoon versus a Sunday afternoon di er on average betwe e n a 1 6 y ear old and a 30 year old but that the relative expected earnings at these two times are the same for both vendors. The relative opportunity costs of participation at these two times likely di er betwe e n a 1 6 y ear old and a 30 year old because of di erences in school enrollment status and family status i.e., whether the individual is married and has children. There is no obvious reason, however, why relative earnings at these two game times should vary with vendor demographic characteristics. promotional date, or if one assumes that the vendors are not baseball fans the identity o f the opposing team at game t | plausibly satisfy this condition.
Aggregate Labor Supply
The theory developed earlier also suggests an empirical model for aggregate outcomes in the vendor labor market. Although an aggregate analysis does not use all of the variation in the data and must ignore the issues of unobserved vendor heterogeneity and self-selected participation, it does o er several advantages. First, the aggregate model can be estimated in one step and is therefore much simpler. Second, testing alternative identifying assumptions is more straightforward for the aggregate model. Third, and most important, one can assess the extent of the bias that results from ignoring the potential endogeneity o f t h e Equation 5 is the empirical counterpart of the average product of labor curve derived in section 3. Again following the theory, I assume that average vendor productivity earnings depends on aggregate vendor participation on date t N t , observable measures of date t product demand X t , and unobserved components of date t product demand t .
The vector X t consists of the ex ante predictors of both attendance and the demographic composition of the crowd e.g., the time of game dummies, the promotional date dummy, the opponent dummies, the weather variables, etc. and, in some speci cations, the actual realization of log attendance.
Theory suggests that is positive aggregate labor supply slopes upward and that is probably negative vendors' average product slopes downward. My primary goal is to consistently estimate , the wage elasticity of aggregate vendor participation. The simultaneous relationship in 4 and 5 implies that ordinary least squares estimation of 4 will produce downward biased estimates of the participation elasticity if the true signs of and are as predicted by the theory. One can estimate consistently, however, by estimating 4 by two stage least squares, using the product demand shifters that do not directly in uence vendor opportunity costs i.e., attendance or certain of its ex ante predictors as instruments for vendor earnings.
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If one views the actual realization as the ex ante expectation plus noise, then this suggests that there will be an errors in variables problem if one uses ln Yt as an explanatory variable. The solution to this problem would be to estimate 4 by instrumental variables, which I d o a n yway to deal with the possible simultaneity bias. I decided on this rule after computing the Kaplan-Meier empirical participation hazard using the complete sample of nonparticipation spell durations implied the observed vendor participation histories. Not surprisingly, the participation hazard falls sharply with the length of time since last participation. For example, the probability that a nonparticipation spell ends on date t falls from .63 to .26 to .04 as the length of the spell increases from 2 days to 16 days to 31 days. The hazard rate is even smaller at longer durations. Since the participation hazard is substantial for short spells of nonparticipation but approaches zero when nonparticipation spells grow long, it makes sense to impute a quit only after a long spell of nonparticipation is observed. Under this rule, the number active status vendor-games expands to 8,712. For obvious reasons, I call the rst de nition of active status vendors who have worked or were hired in the last 30 days narrow" and I call the second de nition all previously hired vendors broad". Although I believe that the narrow de nition of active status corresponds more closely to the set of vendors actually at risk of participating, the estimated labor supply elasticities are always fairly similar for both de nitions. Table 1 Table 2 cuts the data in a di erent way, summarizing the time-series variation in the data. Since participation and earnings vary across vendors at any given game, I focus on the time-series variation by rst calculating average earnings and average or cumulative participation across all vendors for each game and then reporting the means and standard deviations of these game averages. As in Table 1 , I report both unweighted and weighted summary statistics, although the weights are now the numberof vendors who worked at the game or, where noted, the numberofvendors who were active on the game date. In contrast to Table 1 , there are few notable di erences between the unweighted and weighted statistics.
The top panel of Table 2 describes participation behavior across games. The main result of interest is that the game participation rate de ned as the ratio of participating vendors to active vendors at a given game varies considerably between games, regardless of how active status is de ned. Thus, on some dates most of the active vendors participate while on other dates most of the active v endors do not. There are no games, however, where all of the active v endors choose to participate.
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I also examined how product and location assignments varied across vendors. The data show that each individual vendor usually received the same product and location assignments at most games.
The second panel of the table shows average game earnings, both pervendor and per hour of actual vending time, and also characterizes the extent of game-to-game variation in earnings. Average daily earnings over all participating vendors is around $43 at the typical game but uctuates considerably across games, ranging from a low of $26 to a high of $73. The coe cient of variation is roughly the same for average earnings perhour of actual vending time, so between game di erences in actual time spent vending is not the source of this variation. Rather, there clearly are high wage" and low wage" games, although the summary statistics cannot reveal the source of this wage variation. Finally, the last panel of the table reports summary statistics for game-speci c characteristics. The most interesting nding is large game-to-game variation in both attendance and aggregate vendor participation. Tables 3-5 . Because there might berandom unobserved date or game e ects, I always calculate robust covariance matrices that allow for arbitrary correlation of the transitory error components across vendors within each date t. 25 In addition, I also adjust the estimated covariance matrices to account for the fact that one explanatory variable is itself estimated in the models in Tables 4 and 5 . The adjustment follows the methodology described in Murphy and Topel 1985, appropriately modi ed for the case of a robust covariance matrix. Table 3 presents the estimates of the reduced form participation probit model. I report estimates for both the narrow and broad de nitions of active status. I also report estimates both with and without the log of game attendance included as an explanatory All of the speci cations tell the same basic story. Relative to the reference game a nonpromotional Sunday game, the probability of participation is higher for promotional dates and on Friday and Saturday nights, but is much l o wer for weekday afternoon games.
Individual-Level Estimation Results
I present the estimation results for the individual-level empirical model in
The probability of participation also is higher for games against rst place teams and when the home team is closer to rst place in its own division. In some speci cations, the participation probability rises with the daily high temperature but the magnitude of this e ect is always very small. Finally, when attendance is included as an explanatory variable, the participation probability rises with crowd size. The hypothesis tests in the lower part of the table reveal highly signi cant di erences in participation probabilities across individual vendors and across opposing teams. The interactions between the demographic indicators and the time of game indicators also are jointly highly signi cant, which I i n terpret as evidence of important di erences in the temporal pattern of opportunity costs across demographic categories. This interpretation assumes, plausibly, that the e ects of temporal variation in product demand are the same for vendors from all demographic groups, and therefore are captured by the time of game main e ects. The unreported estimated coe cients on the interaction terms generally support this interpretation; for example, teenage vendors, who are likely to be enrolled in school, have m uch l o wer participation probabilities on weekday afternoons and in the spring and fall than do vendors from the reference category. Table 4 , the inverse Mills ratio selection correction term is derived from the reduced form participation probit in the corresponding column of Table 3 . As described earlier, the selection term is identi ed o of the interactions between the vendor demographic characteristics and the time of game dummies, which are assumed to a ect participation but not earnings. There is some evidence that participation is positively selected, as the estimated coe cient on the inverse Mills ratio is always positive and is statistically signi cant for the narrow de nition of active status. This result says that a vendor is less likely to participate when the unobserved transitory earnings component is low e.g., when the vendor is fatigued. Positive selection is precisely what one would expect if the transitory shocks to daily earnings and daily opportunity costs are independent.
The coe cient estimates are essentially identical for speci cations that di er only in how active status is de ned. In contrast, though, whether one controls for game attendance has a large e ect on many o f t h e other estimated coe cients because attendance is highly correlated with many of these explanatory variables. For example, without controls for attendance, earnings are about 30 lower at weekday afternoon games and about 15 higher on promotional dates, other things equal. However, these e ects basically disappear once one controls for attendance. Apparently, the lower earnings on weekdays and higher earnings on promotional dates are driven by swings in attendance. Even after controlling for attendance, though, some of the other explanatory variables remain correlated with earnings because of true temporal e ects in product demand, crowd composition" e ects, or aggregate participation e ects. For instance, holding attendance constant, earnings are about 11 higher at Saturday night games. This might re ect that any given individual spends more on a Saturday night a true temporal e ect, that high spenders are a larger fraction of the crowd on Saturday nights a compositional e ect, or that aggregate vendor participation does not increase proportionately with attendance on Saturday nights.
Finally, there is very strong evidence in all speci cations of systematic individual vendor e ects and opposing team e ects in earnings. Table 5 presents estimates of the main model of interest, the structural participation probit. The key explanatory variable is predicted log hourly earnings and, for each structural probit speci cation, this variable is constructed from the log earnings equation in the corresponding column of Table 4. In the rst and third columns, attendance is not part of the earnings model and therefore I identify the participation model by assuming that the opposing team indicators, the measures of the home and visiting teams' places in the standings, and the promotional date indicator a ect earnings but do not in uence participation except through their e ects on earnings. By excluding the opposing team dummies and the team performance measures from the structural probit, I am assuming that vendors are not baseball fans whose participation decisions depend partly on the quality of the opponent o r the importance of the game. In contrast, in the second and fourth columns, attendance is part of the earnings model and I achieve identi cation by excluding only attendance and the promotional date indicator from the opportunity cost equation. Thus, these speci cations allow for the possibility that vendors are themselves baseball fans.
The coe cient on predicted log earnings is positive and highly signi cant in all of the speci cations. Thus, all else equal, an increase in expected earnings raises the probability of participation. Moreover, the estimated coe cient is basically the same under either set of identifying assumptions described above. Likewise, the results are qualitatively identical if one re-estimates the earnings models using the log of daily earnings as the dependent variable and then uses predicted log daily earnings in the structural participation probit.
Many of the other coe cient estimates are quite similar to those reported in Table 3 . In particular, there is very strong evidence that opportunity costs of time vary greatly across individual vendors and across times of the day and days of the week.
To more clearly illustrate the magnitude of the e ect of expected earnings on participation, I convert the coe cient estimates to elasticities. I actually compute two distinct but similar measures of the average elasticity of participation with respect to expected earnings: 1 the sample mean of the estimated individual elasticities and 2 the estimated elasticity at the sample mean values of the covariates. 27 Since most of the covariates are dummy v ariables, the rst measure is more sensible, but I report the second as well because computing its standard error is much easier. The sample average estimated participation elasticities are approximately 0.55 and 0.75 for the narrow and broad de nitions of active status, respectively, and are always highly signi cant. Thus, stadium vendors appear to supply labor quite elastically. The estimates imply that a 10 rise in hourly earnings about $2 perhour of vending time and about $4.50 perday, at the sample mean would raise the probability of participation by about .03 for a vendor with the mean participation probability. This translates into an increase in aggregate vendor participation of between 2 and 3 vendors when the pool of potential vendors is at its average size. +
Aggregate Estimation Results
I turn to estimation of the aggregate participation equation in Table 6 . As discussed earlier, both product demand shifts and labor supply shifts are potential sources of variation in the daily vendor wage", and therefore the wage measure must betreated as endogenous in the aggregate participation equation. Thus, an instrumental variables estimation procedure is needed to obtain consistent estimates of the participation elasticity. To assess 27 In particular, let^ y denote the estimated coe cient on predicted log earnings reported in the rst row of Table 5 , let^ denote the entire estimated coe cient vector, let Xit denote the vector of covariates for potential vendor i on date t, and let X denote the sample mean value of Xit. Then the estimated elasticity of the probability of participation for vendor i on date t is given by^ y Xit^ =Xit^ , where denotes the standard normal probability density function and denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The rst elasticity measure reported at the bottom of Table 5 is f P T t=1 P N p the importance of recognizing this endogeneity of vendor earnings | in other words, the importance of labor supply shifts as a source of unexplained earnings variation | Table 6 reports ordinary least squares OLS estimates of the aggregate participation equation in addition to the more appropriate two stage least squares 2SLS estimates. Theory predicts that OLS estimates of the participation elasticity will bedownward biased because OLS implicitly assumes that demand shifts are the source of all unexplained wage variation.
The wage measure used in the estimates in Table 6 is average earnings per hour of actual vending time calculated over all participating vendors on each date, but the results are qualitatively the same if one instead uses average daily earnings. Likewise, Table 6 only reports estimates for the case where the pool of potential vendors on each date is calculated using the narrow de nition of active status, but the results are qualitatively similar when the potential vendor pool is calculated using the broad de nition of active status.
The rst two columns of Table 6 present OLS estimates of the aggregate participation equation. In the rst column, I assume that the opponent dummies and the measures of the home and visiting teams' performance do not directly in uence labor supply decisions. For this speci cation, the estimated participation elasticity of 0.24 is signi cantly di erent from zero but is much smaller than the estimates from the individual-level model. When I allow identity of the opposing team and quality of both teams to directly a ect labor supply, the OLS estimate of the participation elasticity falls to 0.09 and is no longer statistically signi cant. Thus, on the basis of the OLS estimates, one would conclude that participation responds weakly to expected earnings if at all.
The 2SLS estimates in the remainder of Table 6 lead to a very di erent conclusion, however. In the third and fourth columns I again assume that vendor participation decisions are not directly in uenced by the identity of the opponent or the quality of the teams as measured by place in the standings. These speci cations di er only in which v ariables are used as instruments for the log of average hourly earnings. The resulting estimates of the participation elasticity of 0.53 and 0.62 are much higher than the OLS estimates and are very similar to the elasticity estimates obtained in the individual-level analysis. However, using the test of overidentifying restrictions described in Newey 1985, I reject the exclusion restrictions that identify the model at conventional signi cance levels p-values of .040 and .021 in the third and fourth columns, respectively. Thus, in the fth column I once again allow the opponent dummies and the variables measuring team quality to directly a ect participation. In this speci cation, realized game attendance and the promotional date indicator serve as instruments for average hourly earnings. The participation elasticity estimate of 0.65 is essentially the same as in the third and fourth columns but now the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected p-value=.400. Finally, i t i s w orth noting that the signs and signi cance of the estimated coe cients on the other explanatory variables generally match the results from the individual-level analysis in Table 5 .
In summary, the evidence from the aggregate labor supply analysis con rms the conclusion from the individual-level analysis that vendor participation decisions are quite responsive to expected earnings. In particular, the aggregate data suggest that the participation elasticity i s b e t ween 0.55 and 0.65. Perhaps more importantly, the aggregate analysis also reveals that the estimated participation elasticity is severely downward biased if one ignores the endogeneity of vendor earnings that arises through game-to-game shifts in the vendor labor supply curve. This nding suggests more generally that, at least in analyses of speci c labor markets where unobserved individual labor supply shocks are likely to have an important common component, one must nd plausible demand shift instruments to obtain credible labor supply elasticity estimates.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the daily labor supply behavior of vendors at a single major league stadium over an entire season and has shown that vendor participation decisions are quite responsive to expected earnings. In particular, both individual-level and aggregate analyses suggest that the elasticity of participation with respect to hourly earnings is in the neighborhood of 0.6. These estimates are always highly signi cant, although the con dence intervals around the point estimates are rather wide. The analysis also suggests that dayto-day shifts in the aggregate labor supply curve of vendors, driven by common shocks to opportunity costs of participation, are an important source of wage variation across games.
Consequently, estimates of the aggregate labor supply equation that treat observed vendor earnings as exogenous produce participation elasticities that are dramatically downward biased. This result highlights the importance of nding demand shifters to use as instruments in labor supply analyses, especially in studies of speci c labor markets where unobserved individual supply shocks might be expected to be highly correlated.
While I believe that I have provided strong evidence that vendors are more likely to work when expected rewards are high, the study has several limitations that should be acknowledged. First, the stadium vendor labor market is just one particular labor market and, given the youth and independent contractor status of the participants and the decidedly part-time nature of the employment, it is a rather unusual one at that. Thus, one should be cautious in generalizing the results found here to other labor markets.
Second, the analysis presented here has ignored the e ort margin of vendor labor supply, focusing entirely on the participation margin. If the supply of e ort conditional on participation also responds positively to product demand conditions, then the overall labor supply elasticity exceeds the participation elasticity measured here. Since the data clearly show that game-to-game changes in aggregate participation do not come close to completely smoothing away wage variation across games, e ort incentives do vary across games. 28 Unfortunately, to identify the e ort elasticity one must separate the direct e ect of demand conditions on earnings from the indirect e ect operating through e ort choice, which requires an untestable assumption about the production function mapping observable 28 Indeed, a positive e ort elasticity which implies that e ort and participation are substitutes from the subcontractor's perspective might help explain why the vendor pool is not larger. In particular, a larger vendor pool raises both recruiting costs and non-vendor labor costs e.g., more cashier-hours need to be hired if more vendors work at games while the increase in total vendor sales will be dampened if, given demand conditions, higher aggregate participation leads to lower e ort levels. demand conditions and unobservable e ort into earnings.
As for its place in the existing labor supply literature, this paper adds to a small and somewhat disparate set of papers that use high frequency data on labor supply and wages to try to learn something about how work e ort responds to transitory wage changes.
For example, Carrington 1996 uses quarterly data on industry employment, hours, and earnings in Alaska during the period of construction of the Alaskan oil pipeline and estimates that labor was supplied quite elastically on both the extensive and intensive margins. Treble 1996, exploiting data on a one-time temporary 2 week duration change in the piece rates paid to miners working at a particular British coal mine in the 1890's, estimates that the elasticity of miners' output with respect to the wage of approximately 1, which implies a positive e ort elasticity. Finally, a s already discussed, Camerer, et. al. 1997 analyze the daily hours decisions of cab drivers and, surprisingly, nd negative w age elasticities of hours worked.
While these studies and the present one are similar in their use of relatively high frequency data, they do not all focus on the same dimension of labor supply. As a result, the elasticities estimated in the di erent papers are conceptually distinct and not directly comparable. The general lesson in the present paper, however, is that estimates of labor supply elasticities for particular labor markets can be seriously biased if one does not have demand shifters to use as instruments for the endogenous wage. Since Camerer, et. al. have no such instruments, this raises questions about their estimated elasticities. Given the focus on hours decisions in dynamic labor supply literature, future work that analyzes individual data from a labor market with both an important hours margin on the supply side and large and observable shocks on the demand side could make a useful contribution. list the numberofvendors for the unweighted sample statistics and the numberofvendor-game observations the sum of the sample weights for the weighted sample statistics. The weighting variable is the number of games worked by each v endor, except in panel A where the weighting variable is the number of games that each v endor was active. Under the narrow de nition of active status, a vendor is included in the pool of potential vendors on date t only if he last worked or was hired in the previous 30 days. Under the broad de nition of active status, a vendor is included in the pool of potential vendors on any date t after the hire date. The vendor participation rate is de ned as the ratio of games worked to games active for each v endor. Standard deviations and extreme values are not reported for dichotomous variables. The estimated covariance matrix allows for an arbitrary error covariance structure across vendors at any given game but assumes independent errors across games, after allowing for vendor xed e ects. The sample sizes are slightly smaller than the total number of active observations in Tables 1 and 2 because the inclusion of vendor xed e ects eliminates vendors who either always participated or never participated. All of the speci cations also include the log of the number of other active v endors, the number of games the opposing team is out of rst place, and indicators for the season before Memorial Day or after Labor Day and for whether the home team was in rst place and as explanatory variables. .669 The estimated covariance matrix allows for an arbitrary error covariance structure across vendors at any given game but assumes independent errors across games, after allowing for vendor xed e ects. One earnings observation is lost under the narrow de nition of active status because there is one vendor who participated at only one game which took place more than 30 days after the date of hire. All of the speci cations also include the log of the number of other active vendors, the number of games the opposing team is out of rst place, and indicators for the season before Memorial Day or after Labor Day and for whether the home team was in rst place as explanatory variables. The estimated covariance matrix allows for an arbitrary error covariance structure across vendors at any given game but assumes independent errors across games, after allowing for vendor xed e ects. The sample sizes are slightly smaller than the total number of active observations in Tables 1 and 2 because the inclusion of vendor xed e ects eliminates vendors who either always participated or never participated. All of the speci cations include indicators for the season before Memorial Day or after Labor Day as explanatory variables. The speci cations in columns 2 and 4 also include the number of games the opposing team is out of rst place and an indicator for whether the home team is in rst place as explanatory variables. 
